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simultaneous Priority
by Roger Bernhardt
This is a comment on an odd recording 
decision, but in order to make the point 
I need to tell the story in a roundabout 
way.
The National Conference of Uniform 
Law Commissioners has not been nota-
bly successful in enacting national real 
estate legislation. The Uniform Land 
Transactions Act (ULTA), The Uniform 
Simplification of Land Transactions 
Act (USOLTA), and the Uniform Land 
Security Interest Act (ULSIA) have all 
quietly passed away with little or no 
impact on state legislation. However, one 
set of provisions of USOLTA was given 
a second wind and subsequently reap-
peared as the Uniform Construction Lien 
Act (UCLA), which has had some slight 
success in piecemeal enactments in some 
states. (UCLA refers to what the rest of 
the profession call mechanic’s liens as 
“construction liens,” which phrase I will 
use for the rest of this article.)
An issue that UCLA seeks to solve is 
the uncertainty inherent in construction 
liens relating back to the uncertain time 
at which a work of improvement first 
commenced, by permitting the filing 
of a “notice of commencement,” which 
sets that date in a fixed and public way. 
That allows a construction lender to 
assure itself of priority over construc-
tion lienors by having its deed of trust be 
recorded before any such notice of com-
mencement is put on the records. That 
is the system operative in the State of 
Nebraska, where Borrenpohl v. Dabeers 
Properties, 755 N.W.2d 39, was decided 
by its state Supreme Court last year. 
In Borrenpohl, the Bank of Bennington 
had loaned DaBeers $66,000 to improve 
its property and had taken a deed of 
trust on that property as security, which 
document it mailed to the county reg-
ister of deeds office for recording. The 
trouble is that the bank also included in 
the same envelope the notice of com-
mencement form in use in Nebraska, 
and it failed to include any cover letter 
containing any filing instructions in the 
envelope.
The county clerk’s recording policy 
in cases where multiple documents 
are received in one envelope without 
instructions is to copy them into the 
record in the order received, from the 
top. And since the notice of commence-
ment was the top document inside the 
envelope, it was stamped at 2:15 p.m., 
with the deed of trust not being stamped 
until 2:20 p.m. (perhaps a coffee break 
in between?). This sequence led to the 
legal consequence of two subsequent 
construction liens, which were recorded 
nine months later, relating back to a 
point in time five minutes earlier than 
the bank’s deed of trust, putting those 
construction lienors prior to the bank’s 
construction loan deed of trust.
At least that is the outcome one might 
expect if recording consists of copying 
documents into the official records. But 
that is not how every jurisdiction defines 
recording: some statutes, including 
Nebraska’s, treat the presenting of the 
document to the recorder’s office as the 
significant act. Under that definition, it 
is not the moment that an instrument is 
copied into the records that determines 
its priority but rather the moment that 
an envelope containing the instrument is 
opened by the recorder. That makes any 
time stamps on documents misleading, 
at least insofar as they are taken to con-
vey relevant information as to when 
those documents were recorded.
The two instruments in this case were, 
according to the Nebraska Supreme 
Court, recorded simultaneously, 
because they arrived at the recorder’s 
office in the same envelope and without 
filing instructions. In a previous column 
I complained about the vice of treat-
ing recording as consisting of delivery 
of a document to the recorder’s office 
instead of as its being properly located 
in the indexes, Misindexed Documents, 
ACMA Abstract, Fall 2006; this ruling 
gives me another ground for complaint. 
A statute that provides that an instru-
ment “shall take effect and be in force 
from and after the time of delivering 
such instrument to the register of deeds 
for recording” such as the Nebraska act 
does, simply invites trouble for future 
conveyancers when it is read literally. 
Instruments take effect as to the par-
ties on “delivery” between them, and 
should take effect as to the rest of the 
world only when they are placed in the 
public records in a way that others in 
the world can find them, not when they 
are simply delivered to the recorder. 
Had that more functional concept of 
delivery been employed, two docu-
ments could be deemed simultaneously 
recorded in the impossible case where 
they bore not only the same time stamp 
but also the same serial number; there 
would really not be any such thing as 
a simultaneous recording for a court to 
have to deal with.
To avoid having its concept of simul-
taneous recording producing an unsat-
isfactory tie between the parties in this 
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case, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
adverted to its old rule that in such situ-
ations, priority is resolved according 
to the “intention of the parties.” The 
principle of having priorities be con-
trolled by intention is novel. Intent is a 
subjective fact, which makes it easy to 
fabricate post facto. (The court’s opin-
ion sought to avoid that obvious risk, by 
calling for the intention of “all parties 
in interest.” The bank filed an affidavit 
declaring that it intended its deed of 
trust to be first; the borrower declared 
the same (probably to avoid being 
accused of fraud by the bank); and the 
construction lienors could produce no 
contrary evidence). Therefore, under 
this rule, the deed of trust had record-
ing act priority over the notice of com-
mencement and, therefore, also over the 
construction liens despite their relation 
back to the notice of commencement.
Intent is not only a subjective fact, it is 
an offrecord “secret” fact. No exami-
nation of the records, nor even of the 
extrinsic facts surrounding delivery of 
the original documents to the records 
office—date on the envelope or instruc-
tions in the cover letter, assuming that 
could be found—would tell a searcher 
which instrument was intended to have 
priority over the other, or even to make 
a prudent searcher suspicious and 
thereby trigger further inquiry about 
them. The fact that a document stamped 
after another document in the records 
might be deemed to have been recorded 
before it is an outcome that even cau-
tious counsel might be unlikely to worry 
or warn a client about. (Dale Whitman, 
to whom I spoke about the case, thought 
that counsel for an apprehensive con-
tractor might well search the records to 
ascertain just what priority any future 
construction lien his or her client might 
later obtain would have, but that only 
makes reliance on the time stamped 
records even more dangerous.)
There is a temptation to view the actual 
result as harmless, because it merely 
denied a construction lienor—who 
probably came long afterwards on the 
scene—the opportunity of gaining a 
windfall leap in priority over a con-
struction lender who had been financing 
the very improvements that were made. 
However, the court’s rule that intention 
controls in cases of simultaneous recor-
dation derived from an earlier decision 
by the same tribunal, in a case involv-
ing two different mortgages, with two 
different lenders, and, obviously, no 
relation back as in the case of construc-
tion liens. So the rule can bite innocent 
lenders as well as contractors.
Of course, where parties have actual 
knowledge of each other, recording act 
principles need not control; other fac-
tors, such as the time of execution or 
the time of delivery of the documents, 
or even the shared or unilateral intents 
of those parties can come into play and 
legitimately affect an outcome. But 
where priority situations involve par-
ties who do not know one another, or 
even know of one another, there are 
only the records to go on, and these are 
somewhat shaky in Nebraska.
There are goods and bads in making 
construction loans in Nebraska. On the 
one hand, the concept of a notice of 
commencement may be a helpful way 
of reducing uncertainties. But on the 
other hand, the definition of recording 
as consisting of handing instruments 
to clerks in the recorder’s office rather 
than looking at whether they are prop-
erly entered in the records or indexes 
creates dangerous priority risks; and 
that danger exists in other jurisdictions 
besides Nebraska. Finally, the notions 
of simultaneous recording and the deter-
mining of outcomes for uninvolved 
third parties by reference to offrecord 
intentions is enough to make me more 
contented with the idiosyncracies of my 
own California legal system!
PS. After I had submitted this column to 
ACMA, I got curious as to why Article 
9 so proudly goes the other way, defin-
ing filing as simply communicating a 
financing statement to the filing office, 
so I went on to the UCC list serve and 
asked. Here is a sprinkling of some very 
thoughtful responses:
The real estate system is not a lien- 
recording system. It is a title record-
ing system that has accepted lien 
recording as an adjunct, subject to its 
other rules. With minor exceptions, 
we do not record titles to personal 
property and this has clearly not 
been an impediment to commerce. 
The UCC filing system is not a title 
system; no one would consider the 
UCC filing system as proving who 
had title to a particular asset. The 
characteristics of the filing system 
for security interests take nearly all 
the opposite choices from the real 
estate system: no signatures, filing 
indexed by debtor only, no need to list 
a particular loan instrument, descrip-
tions by category or even “all assets.” 
So it would not be preposterous to 
say that the presumption would be 
that if the real estate system had a 
particular rule, say, that the risk of fil-
ing office error was on the initial filer, 
the opposite rule should obtain for 
personal property. The filing system 
is not static, and errors can appear and 
disappear without anyone knowing. 
It is only a backup system. The real 
due diligence takes place at the level 
of the relationship between the debtor 
and the secured party. 
The vast majority of UCC filings is  
for deals under $50k, e.g., personal 
property equipment financing. The 
business model pricing and overhead 
continued on page 20
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simply can not support the level of 
inquiry necessary for a real estate 
loan, where typical values are prob-
ably 3-4 times that dollar amount. 
If a filing were not “good” until  
indexed, every filing would require 
a follow up search (and related 
cost) and consideration of a delayed 
funding. Indexed filings may not be 
available to check for a few weeks. 
The presumption is that the filing 
offices do a good job and that sub-
mitted documents in fact do get 
indexed. 
It took me about five minutes to  
check for filings against 5 debtors on 
the Illinois Secretary of State’s web-
site. Total out-of-pocket costs: $0
We recommend to our clients that  
they always do a post-filing lien 
search to confirm that filings to per-
fect their security interest are prop-
erly indexed. 
The only way to know that no one  
else has filed in front of my filing is 
to wait for the certification date to 
catch up and reflect my filing. UCC 
Insurance solves this problem by 
insuring over the gap. With insur-
ance a lender can search, file and 
fund on the same day without wait-
ing for a post search reflecting the 
indexed filing. 
This string points up the benefit of  
pre-filing a financing statement so 
that the SP’s filing will show up on 
a search made prior to funding the 
loan (at least in large transactions). 
The authorization is often contained 
in the lender’s loan commitment 
or proposal letter signed by the 
Debtor. u
with respect to insurance coverage, 
indemnification and communication 
with third parties.
conclusion
Environmental issues are not as dif-
ficult for lenders as they were prior 
to the late 1990s. On the other hand, 
environmental issues now have a 
greater potential to affect lenders 
than one would expect, given their 
treatment over the last 10-plus years. 
Environmental issues are one impor-
tant factor to consider when assessing 
and underwriting risks. Experienced 
legal counsel and technical consul-
tants each play distinct roles in pro-
viding the necessary assistance for 
lenders to make informed inquiries 
and decisions related to environmental 
matters. An understanding and appre-
ciation of these issues will help to 
expand opportunities and limit risks 
for lenders. u
* Pamela K. Elkow and Richard M. Fil 
are partners in the Environmental and 
Utilities Practice Group at Robinson & 
Cole LLP.  Norman H. Roos is a partner 
in the Finance Group of Robinson & Cole 
LLP.
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Despite the economic downturn, it is 
encouraging to note that the Business 
Development Committee reports 
referrals through February 19, 2009 
comparable to referrals from the same 
period last year. 
Finally, a personally difficult deci-
sion has been made with respect to the 
location for the 2011 Annual Meeting. 
When the sky fell in September 2008, 
I was ready to commit to a venue on 
Maui for 2011. After much consider-
ation and valuable advice from many 
(including our Corporate Counsel 
Committee), I concluded that it would 
be in the best interests of the College 
not to select Maui. The good news, 
however, is that we have selected The 
Grand Del Mar in California. It is truly 
a remarkable resort and hopefully 
will prove to be host to a memorable 
Annual Meeting in 2011.
The Executive Committee and 
Regents truly value your input. Please 
feel free to call on any of us this com-
ing year. I look forward to serving 
you in 2009. u
Edward T. Bullard, President
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